A year of military reform, operational expansion and democratic professionalism under President Tinubu
By: Zagazola Makama
The effectiveness of the Nigerian Army is inseparable from the country’s ability to confront terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence and other threats to national security. Since Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu assumed office as the 25th Chief of Army Staff in October 2025, his tenure has been marked by an emphasis on institutional reform, operational readiness, technology, troop welfare, force expansion and the constitutional relationship between the military and democratic authority.
Almost one year into his tenure, the emerging record presents a military leadership attempting to combine battlefield pressure with institutional rebuilding. It is a record that also reflects a broader reality of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration: the government has increasingly placed national security, military modernisation and the welfare of personnel at the centre of its response to Nigeria’s complex security environment.
Rather than measuring Shaibu’s tenure solely by the number of terrorists neutralised or criminals arrested, its significance can also be assessed through the less visible changes taking place inside the Army how soldiers are trained, how formations are positioned, how technology is integrated, how personnel and their families are treated, and how the Army understands its place within a constitutional democracy.
Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu was appointed Chief of Army Staff by President Tinubu on Oct. 24, 2025, succeeding Lt. Gen. Olufemi Oluyede, who moved on to become Chief of Defence Staff. Shaibu brought to Army Headquarters considerable operational experience, having previously commanded major formations and served in counter-insurgency operations in the North-East. His professional background includes service with Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Hadin Kai, as well as senior command and staff appointments.
That background has shaped the character of his command. Rather than presenting the Army merely as a force that reacts to attacks, Shaibu has consistently spoken about building a force capable of anticipating threats, integrating intelligence, exploiting technology and operating jointly with other security agencies.
His early visits to operational theatres reinforced that approach. In November 2025, during his maiden tour of Operation Hadin Kai in Maiduguri, he directed troops to sustain offensive operations against insurgents and deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary required to regenerate their capabilities. The message was clear: the Army under his leadership would seek to maintain pressure on armed groups while simultaneously strengthening the institution behind the frontline.
Perhaps the clearest expression of Shaibu’s institutional thinking came in February 2026 with the introduction of the PROSE Command Philosophy. PROSE represents Professional Excellence, Robust Administration, Operational Readiness, Strategic Cooperation and Exemplary Leadership. Shaibu unveiled the philosophy while addressing participants of Senior Course 48 at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji.
He argued that leadership in Nigeria’s contemporary security environment must be anchored in character, courage and genuine concern for personnel. The significance of PROSE goes beyond an acronym. It attempts to connect five areas that are sometimes treated separately in military administration: professionalism, administration, combat preparedness, cooperation and leadership.
For an Army operating simultaneously in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and internal-security deployments across several regions, the approach recognises that battlefield success cannot be sustained without institutional discipline. In March 2026, Shaibu further linked the philosophy to respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and the Rules of Engagement. He directed commanders to protect civilians and stressed that adherence to those standards was not simply a legal obligation but also a practical requirement for building public confidence and improving intelligence-led operations.
This aspect of the command philosophy is particularly important in counter-insurgency warfare, where the population is not merely a community to be protected but a crucial source of information. One of the strongest features of Shaibu’s tenure has been the emphasis on technology. The Army Chief has repeatedly argued that the nature of warfare is changing and that Nigeria cannot confront modern armed groups exclusively through conventional ground operations.
In May 2026, the Army disclosed the acquisition of additional TP-2 tactical drones and the reconfiguration of Army aviation assets for combat operations. Shaibu said the investments were intended to strengthen surveillance, target acquisition, precision operations and casualty evacuation. He has also advocated deeper integration of unmanned aerial systems and combat aviation into Army training and operations. At the Combat Arms Training Week in Jaji, he described drone warfare and combat aviation as increasingly indispensable components of modern military operations.
This represents an important shift in the Army’s operational philosophy. The traditional model of troops moving into difficult terrain to locate hostile forces is gradually being complemented by persistent surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, improved intelligence fusion and precision-enabled operations. The objective is not technology for its own sake. The strategic purpose is to give commanders better information, shorten reaction time and reduce the exposure of soldiers to unnecessary risk.
Since his assumption of office, the Army has combined offensive operations with expanded formations, improved intelligence fusion, new equipment, specialised training, troop welfare programmes and a reorganisation of the force structure. Perhaps the most consequential development of the year has occurred above the level of individual battlefield engagements. On July 23, 2026, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu approved the expansion of the Nigerian Army from eight divisions to 12 divisions.
The four additional divisions are: 5 Division Makurdi, Responsible for Benue, Nasarawa and Kogi States., 9 Division — Ilorin, Responsible for Kwara and Niger States. 10 Division — Jalingo, Responsible for border areas of Taraba and Adamawa States and 83 Division — Benin City, designed to cover Edo, Delta and Bayelsa States.
The reorganisation also redistributed the responsibilities of existing divisions to create a more rational operational footprint. This represents one of the most substantial structural changes to the Nigerian Army in recent years. Another development that provides the clearest example of Shaibu’s approach to force structure. On Sept. 28, 2026, the Nigerian Army operationalised the 28 Armoured Brigade and Garrison in Birnin Kebbi, alongside the 281 Tank Battalion in Yauri and 381 Artillery Regiment in Kaoje, all in Kebbi State.
The Army said the new formations are intended to expand its operational footprint, strengthen command and control and reduce response times to security threats in the North-West.
This is significant because the North-West’s security challenge is geographically extensive.
Large distances, difficult terrain and dispersed rural communities can give armed groups an operational advantage when security forces must respond from distant bases.
A more distributed force structure is therefore designed to bring troops, armour and fire-support capabilities closer to vulnerable areas.
The development is consistent with a broader restructuring of the Army’s force posture, creating new opportunities but also additional responsibilities for commanders. The philosophy is straightforward: an Army cannot effectively secure territory if its command structures and operational assets are too distant from the communities requiring protection.
Shaibu has also placed emphasis on expanding the Army’s manpower pipeline. From manpower shortages to a larger training architecture.
According to the COAS, two additional training depots have been established in Osogbo, Osun State, and Amasiri-Idda, Ebonyi State, alongside the existing Depot Nigerian Army in Zaria. The objective is to increase the capacity to produce disciplined and combat-ready personnel capable of meeting the country’s expanding security requirements.
This is an important institutional investment.
Recruitment alone does not create combat power. Personnel must be trained, equipped, professionally socialised and deployed within effective command structures. The graduation of 1,182 Special Forces personnel from the Advanced Infantry Training Programme in August 2026 further demonstrated the emphasis on specialised capabilities. At the ceremony, Shaibu again linked combat effectiveness with discipline, human rights and adherence to the Rules of Engagement.
The message coming from Army Headquarters is therefore increasingly consistent, Nigerian soldiers must be capable of confronting armed groups while remaining accountable to the Constitution and the law.
Perhaps another most consequential aspect of Shaibu’s leadership is one that cannot be measured in battlefield statistics: the treatment of the soldier. The Army’s operational effectiveness ultimately depends on the morale, confidence and welfare of the men and women sent into dangerous environments. Under the welfare programme, the Army has reported extensive construction, renovation and infrastructure projects across the six geopolitical zones. The Affordable Home Ownership Option for All Soldiers, or AHOOAS, has also expanded.
The pilot project at Idu, Abuja, delivered more than 400 housing units, which the Army said were occupied by personnel and their families. The scheme has subsequently expanded to locations including Ibadan, Benin, Jos, Gombe and Akwa Ibom. In December 2025, Shaibu commissioned a 60-unit AHOOAS estate in Ibadan, reinforcing the connection between housing, morale and post-service stability.
In June 2026, he commissioned another 80 housing units in Jos.
The Army described the project as part of its broader effort to provide serving and retired personnel with decent and affordable accommodation. At Maxwell Khobe Cantonment in Plateau State, renovated accommodation blocks were also commissioned as part of the welfare drive. These initiatives address an issue that military historians and commanders have long understood: a soldier who knows that his family is secure is better positioned to concentrate on the mission.
The welfare agenda extends beyond serving personnel but also caring for the families of fallen soldiers. The Army has reported improvements in its Group Life Assurance arrangements, including efforts to clear outstanding claims to families of fallen personnel.
Its Education Sponsorship Scheme had supported more than 15,000 children of deceased personnel across different levels of education as of May 2026, according to figures cited by Shaibu. This is more than an administrative intervention. For a military institution that asks its personnel to accept the possibility of death in service, the knowledge that families will not be abandoned after a soldier’s death is an important component of institutional trust. It also reinforces the message behind the Soldier First approach: military professionalism is not only about demanding sacrifice; it is also about creating a system that recognises and supports that sacrifice.
Another emerging feature of Shaibu’s approach is the emphasis on indigenous defence capacity.
The Army Chief has pointed to greater patronage of Nigerian defence institutions and industrial facilities, including the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria, the Command Engineering Depot in Kaduna and the Special Vehicle Plant in Bauchi. The objective is to improve logistics, strengthen self-reliance and reduce institutional dependence on external sources for selected capabilities. For a country facing persistent security challenges, local defence production has strategic implications.
Equipment that cannot be maintained, repaired or replaced quickly can become a liability.
The development of local technical capabilities can therefore contribute to sustainability, especially when operations continue for prolonged periods.
Another defining feature of Shaibu’s public messaging has been the recognition that military effectiveness depends partly on the confidence of the civilian population. The Army has increasingly framed human rights, civilian protection and humanitarian cooperation as operational requirements rather than peripheral public-relations issues. In July 2026, during a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Shaibu reaffirmed the Army’s commitment to international humanitarian law, human rights and established Rules of Engagement. He also highlighted the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Plan, detention-management reforms and efforts to facilitate humanitarian access.
That approach matters in Nigeria’s conflict zones. When communities trust security forces, they are more likely to report suspicious activity, provide early warning and cooperate with investigations. When that confidence collapses, intelligence becomes harder to obtain and criminal and terrorist groups can exploit the resulting information vacuum. For this reason, civil-military relations should be understood as part of the operational architecture.
Perhaps the most politically sensitive dimension of the Army Chief’s tenure is his position on the military’s relationship with democracy.
Shaibu has repeatedly stated that the Nigerian Army must remain apolitical and subordinate to constituted civil authority.
In December 2025, he told newly commissioned officers that the Army must protect democratic governance and remain apolitical in the discharge of its constitutional responsibilities.
That position assumes particular importance as Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections.
The role of the military in elections is constitutionally defined and normally exists in support of civil authorities and the lead security agency, principally the police, rather than as a partisan political actor. Recent military sensitisation activities have reiterated the requirement for neutrality, professionalism and adherence to constitutional responsibilities during electoral duties. This is one of the areas where military professionalism and democratic consolidation directly intersect. A strong military in a democracy is not one that determines political outcomes. It is one that protects the constitutional order while remaining under civilian authority.
Recognition of the Nigerian Army’s counter-terrorism effort
The Army’s reported progress has also attracted external recognition. In July 2026, the Nigerian Army received the Africa’s Best National Army in Counter-Terrorism Operations for 2025 award from African Security Watch. The award was formally presented to Lt. Gen. Waidi Shaibu at Army Headquarters in Abuja. Such recognition should not be treated as proof that Nigeria’s security problems have been solved. Terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and communal violence remain serious challenges.
But it is evidence that the Army’s counter-terrorism performance has received recognition beyond Nigeria.
Operational gains—and the unfinished task
More than 1,106 Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorists during his tenure, including several high-profile commanders operating across the North-East.
Among the notable terrorist leaders neutralised by troops were Abu Bilal Al-Muniki, also known as Abu Mainok; Malam Jidda, Amir of Ngorgore and Malumti villages; Abu Modu; Modu Dogo; Munzir of Dogon Chukun; Abu Aisha, Qaid of Tumbun Mota; and Abul Kaka, among others.
In May 2026, Defence Headquarters announced that coordinated operations involving Nigerian forces and U.S. Africa Command had produced additional strikes against ISIS/ISWAP elements around Metele in the North-East.
The operation demonstrated another important development of the military under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s leadership, the growing importance of intelligence sharing and international cooperation in targeting senior terrorist commanders and concentrations of fighters.
The Army leadership has reported notable operational gains across several theatres, including the use of joint operations, intelligence fusion, modern combat platforms and stronger cooperation with other security agencies. Shaibu has attributed recent successes to investments in MRAP vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, surveillance drones, armed drones and expanded Army Aviation. The broader security environment, however, remains difficult.
Under Operation FANSAN YAMMA, the Army reported that troops neutralised 1,717 bandits, arrested 2,660 suspects and rescued 4,052 civilians during the period covered by the COAS’s operational assessment. The operation also recovered more than 527 AK-47 rifles and over 156,000 rounds of ammunition.
In the North-Central zone, where Nigeria faces a complicated mixture of terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence and other criminal activities, Army formations operating under Operation Enduring Peace, Operation Whirl Stroke and Operation Sahel Sanity recorded another set of gains. The Army reported: 576 criminals neutralized, 8,837 suspects arrested and 2,225 civilians rescued.
In the South-East, troops operating under Operation UDO KA reported the neutralisation of 219 criminals, the arrest of 1,494 suspects and the recovery of weapons and improvised explosive devices. The Army said operations had targeted criminal enclaves, including areas around Orsu Forest and the Okigwe axis, while efforts continued to restore normal socio-economic activity. In the South-South, the Army reported that troops neutralised 134 criminals, arrested 3,896 suspects and rescued 341 civilians. In the South-West, the Army reported 13 criminals neutralised, 1,720 suspects arrested and 131 civilians rescued.
The Army itself has not claimed that these problems have disappeared. Indeed, Shaibu’s repeated emphasis on modernisation, training, intelligence and force expansion reflects an acknowledgement that the security environment is changing faster than conventional military structures can comfortably accommodate.
That may ultimately be the most important test of his tenure: whether the institutional reforms now being implemented can outlast individual operations and survive changes in the security environment.
Why Shaibu’s tenure matters to democratic stability
The connection between military professionalism and democracy is sometimes misunderstood. Democracy does not require a weak military. It requires a professional
military that is strong enough to defend the country but disciplined enough to remain within constitutional boundaries. Nigeria’s experience makes that distinction particularly important.
The Army’s responsibilities extend from counter-terrorism to internal security support, border protection, critical infrastructure security and election-related assistance.
At each level, the constitutional position remains the same: the military serves the Nigerian state and its constitution, not a political party. Shaibu’s repeated emphasis on neutrality, civilian protection and subordination to constituted authority therefore provides an institutional framework for the Army’s democratic role.
The bigger picture was building an Army for the next decade. The significance of Shaibu’s first year is therefore not contained in one operation, one weapon system or one military formation. It lies in the attempt to connect several reforms into one institutional direction. President Tinubu’s role in the transformation is particularly important.
President Tinubu’s role in military modernisation
Shaibu has publicly acknowledged this relationship. In his assessment of Army performance, he attributed recent gains partly to the strategic direction and sustained support of the Commander-in-Chief, saying that the President’s leadership had provided political will, resources and policy guidance for operational success. The relationship between the President and the military is constitutionally defined.
The President, as Commander-in-Chief, establishes the strategic direction and provides the political authority and resources within which the Armed Forces operate. The service chiefs are then responsible for translating that direction into military policy, command and operations. Under Tinubu, the expansion from eight to 12 Army divisions provides one of the clearest institutional examples of this strategic relationship. Shaibu’s tenure has also demonstrated that Nigeria’s security challenge is no longer confined to the conventional battlefield. The expansion of the Army, approval for additional personnel, procurement of critical platforms and investment in troop welfare all require decisions at the highest political level.
The military increasingly operates in an environment where propaganda, social media manipulation, misinformation and psychological operations can influence public confidence almost as significantly as a physical attack.
The Army’s growing emphasis on intelligence fusion, drones, surveillance and information management reflects this changing environment. The battle is simultaneously being fought in forests, villages, highways, borders, cyberspace and the information space.
The first year of Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu’s tenure is best understood as a period of institutional consolidation and operational expansion.
There are also substantial challenges that remain unresolved. Nigeria’s security crisis is too complex to be attributed to one service chief or solved within on year. The Army operates alongside the Navy, Air Force, Police, intelligence agencies, state institutions and local communities. Its performance is therefore one component of a much larger national-security system. But the direction of travel under Shaibu is clear.
It is toward an Army that seeks to be more technologically enabled, more geographically responsive, more attentive to the welfare of its personnel, more integrated with other security institutions and more conscious of its constitutional obligations.
For President Tinubu’s administration, that institutional development has an important national consequence: the government requires a professional military capable of defending the territorial integrity of Nigeria while remaining firmly within democratic civilian control.
That is the constitutional space in which Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu’s tenure should ultimately be assessed not by partisan expectations, but by whether the Nigerian Army becomes more capable, more professional, more accountable and better prepared to protect Nigerians.
And as Nigeria moves toward another electoral cycle, that distinction will matter. The Army’s most important contribution to democracy will not be choosing political outcomes. It will be ensuring that Nigerians are able to live, work, travel, vote and participate in civic life under a constitutional order protected by a professional military that knows precisely where its mandate begins and where it ends.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad Region
