Caught Between Terrorists and the State: How Insider Mediators Face the Greatest Risks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
By: Hon Aliyu Gebi
In every conflict, there are soldiers who fight, governments that formulate policy, and humanitarian agencies that provide relief. Yet hidden between these visible actors exists another category of individuals whose contribution is rarely acknowledged but whose absence could make many humanitarian breakthroughs impossible. They are the insider mediators.
Across the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, where insurgencies by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) continue to challenge state authority, these mediators quietly occupy one of the most dangerous positions in modern conflict.
Unlike diplomats protected by embassies or international organisations operating under diplomatic privileges, insider mediators are ordinary members of the communities engulfed by violence. They include respected Islamic scholars, traditional rulers, village elders, women leaders, businessmen and community influencers whose greatest qualification is not political office but trust.
It is that trust that allows them to speak to men carrying assault rifles in the forests while retaining enough credibility for governments and security agencies to listen. Yet it is the same trust that places them permanently between fire and ice.
Officially, most governments in the Sahel reject negotiations with designated terrorist organisations. Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all adopted counter-terrorism policies centred on military pressure, intelligence operations and criminal prosecution.
Publicly, there is little room for political dialogue with organisations responsible for mass killings, kidnappings and attacks on civilians. Yet conflict realities are rarely as absolute as official policy suggests. When humanitarian workers require safe passage into besieged communities. When hundreds of women and children are trapped in insurgent-controlled territory. When local ceasefires become necessary to allow farmers cultivate their land.
When abducted civilians require negotiation before release. Formal diplomacy often gives way to quiet engagement. That engagement is rarely conducted by ambassadors. Instead, governments frequently rely directly or indirectly on trusted intermediaries capable of reaching actors that official representatives cannot approach. These mediators become the invisible bridge connecting two parties who publicly deny any relationship.
Why outsiders often fail
It was argued that foreign diplomats and international organisations rarely possess the cultural legitimacy required to engage violent extremist groups operating in deeply localised environments. For groups such as JNIM or Boko Haram, international actors are frequently viewed through ideological lenses.
Western governments may be seen as enemies.
United Nations personnel may be viewed as extensions of foreign influence. International NGOs may become intelligence suspects or lucrative kidnapping targets. Local mediators enter the same environment with entirely different credentials. Many speak the same dialect. Some belong to the same ethnic group.
Others share religious traditions or ancestral relationships with insurgent commanders.
In central Mali, traditional Fulani values such as Pulaaku often provide a social framework through which dialogue becomes possible. In the Lake Chad Basin, respected Islamic scholars frequently possess a deeper understanding of the ideological and theological arguments influencing Boko Haram factions than external negotiators. More importantly, insider mediators understand local grievances. They know which disputes are ideological. Which is economic.
Which stem from historical land conflicts. Which fighters joined voluntarily. Which joined because of poverty, coercion or revenge. Such nuanced understanding is often beyond the reach of external actors.
Unlike foreign mediators who return to secure compounds after negotiations, insider mediators remain inside the conflict. Their homes remain exposed. Their families remain exposed.
Every of their secrete remain exposed. Every negotiation they undertake carries consequences that follow them back into their villages. One Negotiator who undertook series of engagement with some Nigerian non state actors to secure the release of captured victims, said they came under ambush more than five times in separate encounter. In one instance, a gun was pointed at his head.
If negotiations collapse. It is not an embassy that is attacked. It is often the negotiators, their own home. If insurgents suspect betrayal. Their wives and children or any of their relatives may become legitimate targets. If security agencies question their motives. They themselves risk detention or prolonged investigation. Few occupations carry such immediate personal consequences.
Perhaps the greatest burden insider mediators carry is that neither side fully trusts them. Security agencies frequently question why a civilian should maintain contact with terrorists.
Some mediators have reportedly faced accusations of collaboration simply because they delivered humanitarian messages or attempted to negotiate community access. From the insurgents’ perspective, however, the suspicion is equally intense. A mediator carrying government proposals may easily be branded an intelligence asset or a mile. If military operations occur shortly after meetings, insurgents may assume information was leaked. The consequences can be fatal.
This creates “double suspicion” a condition in which mediators are simultaneously viewed as potential traitors by both the state and the armed groups they seek to engage.
The legal grey zone
Another challenge identified by the report lies in counter-terrorism legislation. International sanctions and domestic anti-terrorism laws understandably prohibit providing material support to designated terrorist organisations.
However, conflict mediation often operates in ambiguous spaces. Suppose a mediator delivers medicine to secure the release of kidnapped civilians. Or transports communication equipment required to arrange humanitarian access. Or facilitates financial arrangements connected to hostage negotiations. Do such actions constitute humanitarian engagement? Or do they amount to material support under anti-terrorism laws? The report argues that many insider mediators now operate without clear legal protections despite performing functions that governments quietly acknowledge are sometimes necessary. The absence of legal clarity increases both operational and personal risk.
Lessons from JNIM
The report draws heavily from developments in Mali and Burkina Faso. In several communities, local mediators successfully negotiated temporary arrangements allowing farmers to cultivate their fields under agreed conditions.
Some agreements reduced attacks. Others facilitated humanitarian access. Yet these agreements often proved fragile. Military offensives sometimes resumed without warning.
Insurgent commanders interpreted such developments as betrayal. The mediator rather than the state often bore the consequences.
Even more challenging has been the inconsistency of government policy.
During one administration, dialogue may receive quiet encouragement. A subsequent administration may criminalise similar contacts.
Several mediators reportedly found themselves under investigation for activities previously tolerated.
Lessons from Boko Haram: Two Different Negotiation Landscapes
The report notes that mediation efforts in Nigeria’s Lake Chad Basin are further complicated by the internal fragmentation of Boko Haram. Although often viewed as a single insurgent movement, Boko Haram today comprises two principal factions with markedly different organisational structures and negotiation dynamics: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
JAS presents perhaps the most perilous environment for insider mediators. Unlike more structured insurgent organisations, JAS has historically operated through highly decentralised command structures, where individual field commanders exercise considerable autonomy. This lack of central authority often makes negotiations unpredictable, with agreements depending largely on the disposition of local commanders rather than institutional policy. For mediators attempting to secure the release of abducted civilians or establish safe exit routes for fighters seeking to surrender, every mission carries extraordinary personal risk.
Many are required to travel into remote forest enclaves controlled by commanders whose interpretation of Islamic law, tribal customs and military discipline varies widely. Traditional norms that ordinarily protect emissaries or peace envoys are frequently ignored, leaving mediators vulnerable to detention, execution or prolonged captivity if they are suspected of deception or espionage. The report argues that engaging JAS is therefore less a process of structured negotiation than an exercise in navigating constantly shifting personal relationships, ideological rigidity and battlefield uncertainty.
Engaging ISWAP: Structure Without Flexibility
Negotiating with ISWAP presents a different, though equally demanding, set of challenges.
Unlike JAS, ISWAP maintains a comparatively organised governance system overseen by a Shura Council, with clearer chains of command and administrative procedures. This institutional framework can provide mediators with more predictable points of engagement and a greater likelihood that agreements reached with senior figures will be respected across the organisation.
The group’s strict ideological doctrine therefore leaves very limited room for compromise, and mediators often face intense pressure to produce humanitarian outcomes without violating either the insurgents’ religious expectations or the legal and ethical obligations imposed by the state. This delicate balancing act requires exceptional credibility, deep religious understanding and an ability to maintain the confidence of both sides while making no promises that cannot be fulfilled.
The Quiet Architects of Mass Defections
Despite operating under these extraordinary pressures, insider mediators played a pivotal role during one of the most significant developments in Nigeria’s counter-insurgency campaign. Following the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021, tens of thousands of fighters, women and children began surrendering to Nigerian authorities.
While military pressure created the conditions for this unprecedented wave of defections, the report argues that it was trusted local intermediaries who transformed opportunity into reality. Many insurgents seeking to abandon the conflict distrusted formal government institutions and feared immediate execution or imprisonment. Insider mediators became the first point of contact.
They reassured frightened fighters that surrender pathways existed, explained rehabilitation programmes, communicated with military authorities and community leaders, and helped facilitate safe movement from insurgent-controlled territories to designated reception centres. Without these trusted intermediaries, the report suggests, many potential defectors might never have taken the first step toward disengagement. In this sense, insider mediators became the human bridge between years of violent insurgency and emerging opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration.
Protecting the Bridge-Builders
The report concludes that if governments across West Africa hope to move beyond perpetual military confrontation toward sustainable peace, they must provide greater institutional support for insider mediators.
Foremost among its recommendations is the establishment of clear legal frameworks that recognise verified mediators operating for humanitarian purposes. Such protections, the author argue, would reduce the risk of arbitrary arrest or prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation while preserving accountability.
The study also calls on regional organisations and international peacebuilding partners to establish dedicated duty-of-care mechanisms, including emergency security assistance, psychosocial support and evacuation arrangements for mediators facing credible threats. Given the psychological burden associated with prolonged engagement in conflict environments, the report argues that mental health support should become an integral component of mediation programmes rather than an afterthought.
The report ultimately presents insider mediators as one of the least visible yet most indispensable pillars of conflict resolution in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. They receive little public recognition, enjoy few institutional protections and often operate without formal legal safeguards. Yet they continue to facilitate hostage releases, humanitarian access, civilian evacuations, local ceasefires and pathways for surrender in places where official diplomacy cannot reach. Their work demonstrates that while military operations remain essential in degrading terrorist capabilities, lasting peace is seldom achieved through force alone. It also depends on trusted local relationships, cultural legitimacy and the courage of individuals willing to engage where others cannot.
As governments refine their counter-insurgency strategies across the region, the report argues that protecting these “bridge-builders” is not merely a humanitarian obligation but a strategic necessity. Without them, opportunities for dialogue, disengagement and civilian protection may diminish, leaving military victories without the social foundations needed to secure enduring peace.
